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 1 
I. Introduction 1 
The wildlife trade involves the sale or exchange of wild animals or plants and their 2 
derivatives, such as skins, tourist curios, or food products. It is estimated that this global trade is 3 
worth up to $350 billion annually, with illegal transactions accounting for approximately $20 4 
billion (TRAFFIC n.d.; Wyler & Sheikh 2008; Petrossian et al. 2016; UNODC 2016). Data on 5 
illegal trafficking seizures indicate that the wildlife trade is unevenly distributed across taxa; 6 
mammals account for 51% of all wildlife seizures, with ivory being a significant subcategory, 7 
making up 25% of mammalian seizures by number (TRAFFIC n.d.; Petrossian et al. 2016). 8 
By 1976, the ivory trade had pushed elephants to the brink of extinction. Plunging African 9 
elephant (Loxodonta africana) populations drew international attention, at which point concerns 10 
about their long-term survival led to their listing by the Convention on the International Trade in 11 
Endangered Species (CITES). By 1989, the African elephant had made its way onto CITES 12 
Appendix I, which criminalized all international trade and left individual nations responsible for 13 
the regulation of domestic trade activity (Lemieux & Clarke 2009). In 1999 and 2008, however, 14 
several elephant range countries had elephants down listed to Appendix II due to increasing 15 
populations, and legally auctioned government-stockpiled ivory to designated Asian trading 16 
partners. These two events are known as the “one-off ivory sales” (USFWS 2013). Up until 17 
2016, China and the US, the two largest ivory markets, still had legal components to the trade. In 18 
2016, however, both countries agreed to shut down markets by the end of 2017. The following 19 
analysis assesses market data from 1989 to this 2017 shutdown, which will likely mark a new era 20 
for the ivory trade and African elephants.  21 
Almost 600,000kg of illegal ivory has been seized since 1991 (CITES Secretariat 2016a, 22 
2016b). Primarily the product of elephant poaching, these seizures represent the death of 23 
 2 
approximately 50,000 elephants per year, highlighting the grave effects of the trade on remaining 24 
African elephant populations, currently estimated at just over 350,000 (Chase et al. 2016).  25 
As is the case for any commodity, the ivory trade (and therefore elephant poaching activity) 26 
is driven by demand (Milner-Gulland & Leader-Williams 1992; Knapp 2012; Holden & 27 
McDonald-Madden 2017; Holden 2018). Higher ivory market prices lead to higher poaching 28 
incentives, and therefore greater numbers of elephants being killed. Previous researchers have 29 
studied ivory price at multiple levels ranging from local markets to national scale, but the 30 
majority of studies suffer from data deficiency or employ a purely qualitative approach.  31 
One of the first analyses examining trends in ivory market price was performed by 32 
Wittemyer et al (2014). The authors collated price information from markets in Samburu, Kenya 33 
and demonstrated that observed spikes in ivory price circa 2008 were correlated with increased 34 
elephant poaching and ivory seizure rates. This study, although limited to Samburu, was among 35 
the first to link ivory prices to elephant poaching and illegal seizures (Wittemyer et al. 2014).  36 
Gao and Clark performed a similar analysis in 2014, focusing specifically on price trends in 37 
China. The researchers visited Chinese ivory markets to gather information on ivory price, type, 38 
and weight, amongst other variables. Through their analysis, Gao and Clark established that 39 
illegal ivory prices increased dramatically in the years leading up to 2013, and that illegal raw 40 
ivory was approximately ten times more expensive in China than in Africa (Gao & Clark 2014).  41 
Gao and Clark’s (2014) conclusions about increasing prices were supported by ‘t Sas-Rolfes 42 
et al. (2014), who observed significant ivory price increases from 2000-2014 in both Africa and 43 
East Asia. The researchers noted increases in elephant poaching and ivory seizures around 2008, 44 
which supported the findings of Wittemyer et al. (2014).  45 
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In 2015, Stiles, Rowan, and Moyle published a study drawing connections between the 46 
previously noted price increases and both the one-off ivory sale of 2008 as well as the Global 47 
Financial Crisis of 2007/2008. Their analysis also explored relationships between ivory prices 48 
and elephant poaching, ivory shipping costs, and macroeconomic indicators such as LIBOR and 49 
gold price (Stiles et al. 2015). 50 
The only quantitative approach to analyzing ivory markets was published by Milner-Gulland 51 
in 1993. In this paper, Milner-Gulland developed an econometric model to describe consumer 52 
demand for ivory and rhino horn in Japan, which was found to be primarily income-driven. This 53 
analysis, however, is relatively out of date and limited solely to Japanese markets (Milner-54 
Gulland 1993). 55 
Each of these publications highlights the multidimensional nature of the ivory trade by 56 
integrating variables such as the estimated number of elephant poaching events, global ivory 57 
seizure volumes, the type, weight, and legality of ivory, and various macroeconomic indicators. 58 
To the best of our knowledge, however, there have been no attempts to integrate these variables 59 
with market price data in a systematic manner. There is also a lack of studies exploring market 60 
prices both temporally and geographically. The aim of this study, therefore, was to examine a 61 
large dataset of ivory market prices, together with information such as ivory product type (raw, 62 
polished, carved), weight, region, and legality. Alongside the Transaction Index (TI) (which 63 
estimates the number of transactions in a given year) and world gold price, this data will be used 64 
to (1) examine the temporal and geographic trends in market price since the 1989 CITES ban, (2) 65 
determine factors significantly linked to ivory price, and (3) propose a predictive equation for 66 
price based on these factors.  67 
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By exposing trends in market price since the 1989 CITES ban and identifying its 68 
determinants, it is hoped that better policy decisions can be made with regards to regulation, 69 
education, and conservation efforts. This could, for example, be more stringent trade regulation 70 
in regions where ivory price, and therefore likely demand, is highest. Ideally, this would lead to 71 
decreased poaching incentives and a more secure future for elephants. 72 
 73 
2. Methodology  74 
2.1 Data collection 75 
Market data was obtained from two sources. The UK-based non-profit ‘Stop Ivory’ 76 
facilitated the provision of pricing data collected between 1999 and 2004. This dataset contained 77 
320 individual transactions from ivory markets visited across Africa, Europe, as well as South, 78 
Southeast, and East Asia. Some historical samples in this dataset stretched back to 1874. This 79 
novel unpublished data was collected using the methods described in Martin and Stiles’s 80 
previous publications (Martin & Stiles 2000, 2002, 2003, 2005).  81 
A second set of information was collected via literature search. The search for articles was 82 
executed using the databases Science Direct, Web of Science, and Google Scholar. Google web 83 
searches were also used to find news publications citing ivory prices. Search terms included 84 
‘ivory price,’ ‘ivory market survey,’ ‘elephant ivory,’ ‘ivory trade,’ and their variations. Prices 85 
were recorded only from peer-reviewed publications, globally recognized news sources, or 86 
reputable elephant non-profit organizations to ensure price sample reliability. A complete record 87 
of collected samples and their information sources is provided in appendix A.  88 
Ivory prices from both datasets were filtered to only include samples from 1989 onwards in 89 
order to focus on the global market after the 1989 (CITES) ban on the international ivory trade. 90 
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Once filtered, the first dataset contained 182 samples and the second 109 samples. This filtered 91 
data was used for all analyses. 92 
Data from both sets included the following information: market price, product type (raw, 93 
polished, or carved), estimated weight of sample, country of transaction, legality of transaction 94 
(legal, illegal, or unknown), and the year of the transaction. Raw ivory was defined as tusks that 95 
had not been carved, polished, or worked, essentially coming straight from an elephant (n=201); 96 
polished ivory was defined as tusks that had been polished but not been worked or carved 97 
(n=33); and carved ivory was defined as tusks that had been carved and worked (n=48). Data 98 
was also classified by legality as legal (n=118), illegal (n=83), and unknown (n=90), based on 99 
the records of the original data collectors. 100 
Prices were calculated in USD against the weight of the ivory piece and then adjusted for 101 
inflation using the US Consumer Price Index (CPI). This resulted in the final unit of 2017-102 
equivalent USD per kg. Inspection of the residuals from the statistical models for normality and 103 
homogeneity of variance (applied to inflation-adjusted prices) suggested that the natural 104 
logarithm of price should be used as the outcome variable to satisfy the modeling requirements. 105 
Therefore, all prices hereafter referred to are the natural log of 2017 USD/kg (‘LnPrice’). 106 
Due to sample size constraints, samples were grouped by region, rather than by country. 107 
Regional groupings were maintained as originally assigned by Martin and Stiles (2000, 2002, 108 
2003, 2005) in their market surveys (Table 1). 109 
 110 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]   111 
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Finally, the following global-level variables were collected for each year since 1989: ivory 112 
Transaction Index (TI) (Milliken et al. 2013; Underwood et al. 2013; CITES Secretariat 2016a) 113 
and the international price of gold (Macrotrends n.d.). 114 
Ivory TI was applied to this analysis as an index of transaction activity for a given year. 115 
Applied to the trade in 2013 by Underwood, Burn, and Milliken, TI estimates the relative 116 
number of transactions of a target good in a given year (Halpern 1997; Underwood et al. 2013). 117 
Ivory TI also takes into account the number of ivory seizures made by 68 countries for each year 118 
from 1996 to 2015 as well as the relative weight of ivory seized. 119 
 120 
2.2 Statistical Analysis 121 
R v3.5.1 (R Core Team 2018) was utilized for statistical analyses. A univariate general linear 122 
model (GLM) was used to examine temporal and spatial trends and to determine factors 123 
significantly associated with the price of ivory. LnPrice was the dependent variable; fixed factors 124 
tested within the models included data source (field surveys versus literature search), legality, 125 
product type, and region. Covariates tested in the analysis were weight of sample, as well as TI 126 
and gold price of the year of transaction. All fixed factors and covariates were assessed for their 127 
statistical significance at an alpha of 0.05. 128 
2.2.1 Temporal and geographic analysis 129 
For temporal analysis, price data was initially plotted against time and fit using LOESS (75% 130 
points to fit, Kernel = Epanechnikov). The fit of the LOESS suggested splitting the data to fit 131 
two linear regression models (Fig. 1). The price data was consequently fit with two linear models 132 
to provide a stronger summary of the price trends over time – the location of the split is 133 
discussed below.  134 
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2.2.2 Price determinants 135 
A series of GLMs were run to test different combinations of fixed factors and covariates. An 136 
initial series of GLMs tested for a significant overall difference between the data from the two 137 
sources. Because no difference was found, this factor was removed from all subsequent models 138 
and the combined dataset was used throughout the remaining modeling process. This modeling 139 
process involved running the GLM repeatedly to identify the strongest combination of predictors 140 
of ivory price, assessed collectively by adjusted R-squared values and significance levels. All 141 
factors in the final model that were statistically significant (p <0.05) were retained. It should be 142 
noted that, because of the exploratory nature of this type of study, p-values here should only be 143 
seen as a guideline to identify candidate variables that can be assessed as causal factors in future 144 
hypothesis-led studies. Amongst the factors tested but subsequently removed were: weight, 145 
amount of ivory crushed per year, China’s gross national income, and the proportion of elephants 146 
illegally killed per year (PIKE). 147 
 148 
3. Results 149 
3.1 Temporal and geographic analysis 150 
A LOESS fitted curve was applied to the overall ivory market price data (Fig. 1). The data 151 
suggested an initial slow decrease in LnPrice followed by a steep increase after approximately 152 
the year 2000. The precise point of inflection is hard to discern, as the LOESS fitted line will be 153 
overly influenced by the weight of data from 1999, for which price samples were heavily 154 
clustered from Africa. The year 2007 was selected as a break point due to historic, recorded 155 
market changes, discussed below. The LOESS fitted line does suggest a slightly earlier point of 156 
inflection; however, even if an earlier point of inflection were to be adopted, the slopes of the 157 
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two fitted lines would remain relatively unaffected. The mean annual price of ivory as LnPrice is 158 
graphed by region as well as globally (shown as world means) (Fig. 2). 159 
 160 
[INSERT FIG. 1 ABOUT HERE] 161 
[INSERT FIG. 2 ABOUT HERE] 162 
 163 
3.2 Price determinants  164 
There was no statistically significant difference between LnPrice from the two data sources, 165 
namely the field survey data and data collected via literature search, therefore, this term was 166 
dropped from the model, as was the variable ‘estimated weight of ivory,’ which proved 167 
insignificant to price estimation. The variables retained in the final model included region, type, 168 
legality, the region*legality interaction, the region*type interaction, TI and the world gold price 169 
(see Table 2 for predictive variables retained in the final model and their levels of statistical 170 
significance). Baseline values, or those tied to the intercept in the equation, are the ‘Africa’ 171 
prices, ‘carved’ ivory type, and ‘illegal’ legality.  172 
 173 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 174 
 175 
The analysis presented shows that the relationship between the price of ivory and region, 176 
legality and type is complex (Table 2). The significant interaction term between region and type 177 
indicates that the price differential between the different types of ivory is dependent upon region, 178 
and the significant interaction between region and legality indicates that the price differential 179 
between the legality categories is also dependent upon region. The model also shows that, on 180 
 9 
average, for every unit increase in TI (transaction index, i.e. related to the number of transactions 181 
in a given year) there was an associated 0.0006 increase in LnPrice and for every unit increase in 182 
gold price an associated increase of 0.001 in TI. 183 
 184 
[INSERT FIG. 3 ABOUT HERE] 185 
 186 
Ivory price is depicted as it varies according to legality across regions (Fig. 3a). Overall, 187 
illegal ivory was the most expensive. Ivory of unknown legality had intermediate prices, while 188 
legal ivory had the lowest prices. Asian (i.e. East as well as South and Southeast Asia) and online 189 
illegal ivory had particularly high prices. Africa and Europe, on the other hand, had notably low 190 
legal ivory prices. Southeast Asia had almost equal legal and illegal ivory prices, a phenomenon 191 
which did not occur in any other region. 192 
The model shows that prices tended to be higher for carved and polished ivory (Fig. 3b). For 193 
all types, higher prices were observed across Asia. East Asia had particularly high prices for 194 
carved and polished ivory; the significant interaction between region and product type such that 195 
the East Asian carved ivory was notably more expensive (p=0.007). Prices for carved and 196 
polished ivory were lowest in Africa, with slightly higher prices observed across Europe and the 197 
USA.  198 
 199 
4. Discussion 200 
4.1 Summary of Findings 201 
The price model developed explains approximately 72.5% of the variation in the ivory price 202 
(LnPrice) since the CITES ban. Determinants significant to ivory market price included: (1) 203 
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region; (2) type; (3) Transaction Index; and (4) legality. Interaction effects were present between 204 
region and legality, and between region and type. There was a strong positive linear relationship 205 
between Transaction Index (which estimates the number of ivory transactions each year and 206 
takes into account both the number and weight of ivory seizures made from 1996 through 2015) 207 
and year, with a general increase with successive years (see appendix B).  208 
The total weight of ivory at a sale proved a non-significant factor on price per kilogram. 209 
Weight in the current dataset ranged from a minimum 0.17kg to a maximum of 80kg, with a 210 
mean of 5.4kg and a standard deviation of 7.1kg. A histogram of the reported sample weights is 211 
included within appendix C. Various publications, including those by CITES, classify weight of 212 
each ivory transaction into three categories of: <10kg, 10-100kg, and 100kg+ (Underwood et al. 213 
2013; CITES Secretariat 2016b), and deem weight an important factor in the analyses of ivory 214 
trade data, with larger pieces generally attracting higher prices per kilogram. It is likely due to 215 
the limited weight range and generally low weights in comparison to other reports, that weight 216 
was not significant in the present model. 217 
 218 
4.2 Identified price determinants 219 
The identified price determinants, such as region, product type, legality, and the interactions 220 
between region and legality as well as region and type, may reflect the sociocultural demand for 221 
ivory in its various forms. Regional differences in particular should be representative of social 222 
and cultural demand. Regional demand for a type of ivory (raw, polished, carved) may be 223 
reflective of the more particular market demands, as well as potentially the existence of domestic 224 
ivory processing facilities. For example, high prices across Asia are likely reflective of a local 225 
demand, and distinctly higher prices of carved and polished ivory in East Asia (Fig. 3b) may be 226 
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indicative of particularly strong demand for these products. Legality may also reflect 227 
sociocultural attitudes towards ivory or regional enforcement activity. Almost equivalent prices 228 
for legal and illegal ivory observed in South Asia may be indicative of a disregard of ivory 229 
legality or low risk of law enforcement intervention.  230 
As discussed, TI is indicative of global market size, with more global transactions 231 
corresponding to a larger global market and higher prices. The inclusion of TI in the model 232 
should account for fluctuations in the global market, therefore more accurately depict 233 
sociocultural demand both globally and regionally.   234 
Lastly, world gold price is indicative of global investment into and demand for luxury goods. 235 
Gold market prices fluctuate due to interest rates, geopolitical relations, currency markets, 236 
inflation and deflation, investment demand, and equity markets (Gold Price 2018). The 237 
integration of world gold price into the model reflects these factors and the status of the global 238 
economy, which would affect the price of ivory, another luxury good.  239 
4.3 Other price determinants 240 
Other variables likely explain the price discrepancies between regions, type, and legality 241 
observed and must account for at least some of the 28.1% of variation unaccounted for by the 242 
model. These may include corruption-related expenses, shipping costs, speculative investing, 243 
production costs, ivory quality, and significant events including signings of international 244 
agreements and ivory destructions by authorities. 245 
4.3.1 Corruption 246 
Legal prices were lower than those for illegal ivory across almost all regions (Fig. 3a); the 247 
exception is South and Southeast Asia. The prominence of corruption and bribes in South and 248 
Southeast Asian regions may account for the difference in price according to legality observed. 249 
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As the prices of ivory classified as ‘unknown’ legality were similar to those of illegal ivory in 250 
East Asia, it is probable that much of this ivory was also illegal. Bennett (2015) reported that up 251 
to $30,000 a day might be disbursed in bribes to officials on the Vietnam-China border. These 252 
officials often facilitate the integration of illegal ivory into legal markets and contribute to 253 
already poor law enforcement (Martin & Stiles 2003; Moyle & Conrad 2014; Bennett 2015; 254 
Vigne & Martin 2016). Due to the clandestine nature of these activities there is data deficiency 255 
preventing the inclusion of corruption into the model.  256 
4.3.2 Shipping costs  257 
Shipping expenses impact both operational costs and market prices. Moyle (2014) 258 
demonstrated that shipping costs were correlated with smuggling levels, as indicated by ivory 259 
seizures. Specifically, lowered transport costs were correlated with increased ivory seizures 260 
indicating larger volumes being transported. If shipping costs influence the volume of ivory 261 
smuggled, they are likely to affect market prices indirectly. Because shipping costs have been 262 
demonstrated to follow similar patterns to global ivory seizures and global business cycles 263 
through the oil price, they were not integrated into the present model and instead were accounted 264 
for using TI and gold price.  265 
4.3.3 Speculative investing 266 
It has been reported that the estimated amount of ivory leaving Africa is not fully accounted 267 
for in seizures and market sales (Moyle & Conrad 2014; Stiles 2015). This suggests a leak into 268 
an alternative market – likely speculative stockpiling. Stiles et al. (2015) as well as Moyle and 269 
Conrad (2014) show that the 37 legal factories in China only had a collective throughput of 28-270 
30 tusks per month from mid 2009 to early 2014. During this same period, up to 200 mega tons 271 
of ivory could have been entering China per year; at an average of 10kg per tusk this would 272 
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equate to 20,000 tusks per year. This large discrepancy is most likely accounted for by 273 
speculative stockpiling. This behavior may increase demand for primarily raw ivory, which 274 
would in turn affect market prices (Stiles et al. 2015). As with many black market commodities, 275 
there is data deficiency when it comes to inventory; the volumes kept for investment each year 276 
were unclear and therefore not incorporated into our price model.  277 
 Bulte, Mason, and Horan (2003) have further discussed the profitability of speculative 278 
stockpiling when it comes to endangered species. Linking the value of this practice to the 279 
dynamics of supply and demand, the authors argue that the profitability of such behaviors may 280 
be tied to an active effort to decrease long-term supply – in the case of elephants, poaching. The 281 
large scale killing of certain species (such as elephants) directly increases the value of wild 282 
stocks, and therefore fuels a cycles of behavior the authors have coined “banking (or betting) on 283 
extinction” (Bulte et al. 2003; Mason et al. 2012). 284 
4.3.4 Production costs 285 
Both polished and carved ivory require work by a craftsman. Martin and Stiles (2003) cite 286 
the salary of an experienced craftsman in Tokyo in 2001 to reach $38,400 per year, while an 287 
average-earning craftsman in working part time in Hong Kong earned an average $18,000 per 288 
year in 2002. These labor costs must be accounted for in the market price of any worked ivory, 289 
explaining price discrepancies between raw and worked pieces. However, little other data exists 290 
as to ivory craftsman salaries, making it impossible to include in the price analysis. The dummy 291 
variable in our model accounts for this difference to some degree (i.e. linearly). 292 
4.3.5 Quality  293 
Quality of ivory, which generally refers to color and presence of visible cracks, has not been 294 
systematically quantified. However, various price citations note differences between low and 295 
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high quality ivory. In Thailand, for example, high quality ivory was reported to attract as much 296 
as double the standard price, or $182 rather than $91 per kilogram (Martin & Stiles 2002). 297 
Differences based on quality were also noted in Cambodia, where prices ranged from $100 to 298 
$340 per kilogram around 1994. In 2001, Vietnamese prices fluctuated by approximately $170 299 
per kilogram due solely to quality. Thus, quality could contribute to variations in price for 300 
similar types of ivory.  301 
4.3.6 Significant events  302 
Various events since the 1989 ban could have impacted market price. These include two one-303 
off ivory sales, the adoption of the Cotonou Declaration, as well as various major ivory seizures 304 
and destructions. In 1999, CITES approved the first one-off ivory sale of Botswanan, Namibian, 305 
and Zimbabwean stockpiles to a designated trading partner in Japan (USFWS 2013). The second 306 
one-off sale occurred in 2008 of Botswanan, Namibian, Zimbabwean, and South African 307 
stockpiles to China and Japan. These sales added approximately $5 million and $15.5 million 308 
worth of ivory into the market, respectively, which likely affected global supply and demand 309 
dynamics (USFWS 2013; Hsiang & Sekar 2016).  310 
The second one-off sale was followed by the adoption of the Cotonou Declaration by 22 311 
African elephant range states in 2015. The declaration called for a closure of all domestic ivory 312 
markets in an effort to end the trade and conserve elephants (WCS 2016). African market prices 313 
are much below the world average and those of other regions (Fig. 2), however, as this 314 
declaration was adopted in 2015, the discrepancy is likely due to other factors, such as minimal 315 
of shipping costs within Africa as opposed to abroad, and lower labor costs. 316 
This second one-off sale corresponded with the 2007 inflection point applied to display the 317 
trends in ivory market prices. The use of 2008, the year of the sale, as the inflection point made 318 
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little difference to the fit of the lines. The data inflection point also corresponded with the Global 319 
Financial Crisis of 2007-2008 (Wittemyer et al. 2014; ’t Sas-Rolfes et al. 2014; Stiles et al. 320 
2015).  321 
Since 1989, over 20 countries have crushed and burned more than 260 tons of ivory, the 322 
majority having been destroyed in the last 5 years (Biggs 2016; Braczkowski et al. 2018). Not 323 
only a symbol of ivory devaluation (Nuwer 2013; Coghlan 2015), these destructions remove 324 
ivory from potential re-entry into the market, and therefore may affect supply and demand. It is 325 
difficult to estimate how much ivory is being crushed or burned from global stockpiles due to the 326 
secrecy surrounding government inventory. Based on ETIS global seizure data submitted by 327 
participating governments and reports of global ivory destruction retrieved via literature and 328 
Google searches for news articles, we estimate that approximately 40% of all ivory seized 329 
between 1991 and 2016 has been destroyed. A graph of these destructions by country is available 330 
in appendix D. 331 
’t Sas-Rolfes (1997) argued that destroying ivory stockpiles reduces the potential legal 332 
supply relative to demand, thereby increasing the perceived market value of ivory. This could 333 
inflate market prices and make trade more lucrative. Ivory destruction was not included in the 334 
model due to the inclusion of TI, which accounts for ETIS seizure data, and therefore 335 
government holdings. Our supplementary destruction dataset includes records on the total 336 
amount of ivory destroyed within a calendar year for nine separate years, the first being 1998. A 337 
follow-up two-tailed test for bivariate correlation between the total amount of ivory crushed or 338 
burned globally and the price of ivory (LnPrice) was not significant (r=0.430, p=0.288). 339 
However, given the small sample size and the magnitude of the correlation, we cannot rule out 340 
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the possibility that a significant positive relationship would become apparent with a larger 341 
sample size. 342 
4.3.7 Other determinants 343 
There are two other potential variables that could not be tested due to data restrictions or 344 
redundancy that might account for price discrepancies and/or the unaccounted remaining 28.1% 345 
of variation. The first is changes in the trade chain over time, for instance by increased 346 
militarization (Duffy et al. 2019) or integration into terrorist or narcotics networks (Wyler & 347 
Sheikh 2008; ADMCF 2018); the second is natural fluctuations in elephant population ecology 348 
which could alter the perceived value of ivory or potentially increase the challenge of poaching 349 
(Courchamp et al. 2006; Holden & McDonald-Madden 2017). Of the two, the latter issue can 350 
potentially be addressed by means of bioeconomic modelling using the present data, as discussed 351 
in the concluding section. 352 
 353 
4.4 Analytical Limitations 354 
One of the most cited limitations of studying the ivory trade is data deficiency. The illegal 355 
ivory trade and related poaching activity are by nature cryptic. Many researchers have found it 356 
difficult to gather data on issues related to the ivory trade and hence study global ivory prices of 357 
ivory over time (’t Sas-Rolfes et al. 2014; Wittemyer et al. 2014; Stiles et al. 2015). In the 358 
present study, this limitation was partially overcome by incorporating both novel market surveys 359 
data from Martin and Stiles, as well as originally collected data into a meta-analysis.  360 
Another potential issue is systematic biases, whereby both ETIS (Elephant Trade Information 361 
System) and PIKE (Proportion of Illegally Killed Elephants) datasets are underestimated in some 362 
areas as warned by, and therefore may influence TI (Underwood et al. 2013).  These biases arise 363 
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primarily due to the varied but limited abilities of countries to make ivory seizures as well as 364 
report those seizures to the ETIS database (Underwood et al. 2013; CITES Secretariat 2016b). 365 
There are, however, no better estimates of ivory seizures, elephant poaching, or transactions that 366 
are currently available.  367 
 368 
 369 
5. Conclusion 370 
Ivory price data included in this analysis start in 1989, the time of the CITES ban and reach 371 
2017. Globally, our analysis indicates that prices have been increasing since this ban. 372 
Researchers disagree, however, on the effect of the ban on elephant poaching. Some argue that it 373 
has reduced or reversed the decline in elephant populations by making international trade illegal 374 
and by increasing criminal risks for those partaking (Khanna & Harford 1996; Lemieux & Clarke 375 
2009). Others argue that it has stimulated speculative stockpiling, potentially increasing the price 376 
of ivory and encouraging poaching activities to continue (’t Sas-Rolfes 1997). We hope our 377 
exploratory analysis can provide some insights into this debate.  378 
The present analysis has provided a global overview of ivory prices since the CITES trade 379 
ban, giving both geographic and temporal perspectives. The model depicted overall increasing 380 
price trends commencing at some point after 2000, with highest market values in Asia.  381 
It is hoped that by elucidating these trends and the variables relevant to price determination, 382 
better decisions can be made with regards to global ivory policies. An understanding of regional 383 
price trends and associated demand, alongside a comprehension of which factors influence 384 
market price, can inform conservationists, law enforcement, and policy makers on where to focus 385 
efforts on ivory trade campaigns, wildlife conservation, and education. For example, focusing 386 
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limited resources on efforts to more heavily regulate trade in East Asia, where ivory price and 387 
therefore demand likely is highest, could lead to decreased poaching incentives and a more 388 
secure future for elephants. 389 
 Finally, quantitative results from the present study have the potential to contribute to the 390 
bioeconomic modeling literature (Bulte &Van Kooten 1999; Bulte & Swanson 2003; van 391 
Kooten, 2008; Holden & McDonald-Madden 2017) that examines optimal intervention 392 
mechanisms related to elephant population management. For example, existing models could be 393 
calibrated, tested and modified with the regional and temporal price trends identified in Section 3 394 
to improve their accuracy and hence derive more effective policy design. This may add evidence 395 
to support decisions concerning the CITES ivory ban, national trade regulations, as well as to 396 
global stockpile management. A similar framework could also be applied to other endangered 397 
species experiencing poaching and illegal trade in their products, such as rhinos and tigers, so as 398 
to achieve more orchestrated conservation efforts for global wildlife.  399 
  400 
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Table 1. Regional grouping with included countries 543 
Region N Definition 
Africa1  104 Gabon, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Cote D’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Ethiopia, Nigeria, Senegal, Kenya, Egypt, 
Tanzania, Zimbabwe 
Europe1 17 Germany, France, and the United Kingdom 
East Asia1  47 China, Hong Kong, Japan 
South/S. East Asia1  17 Thailand, Cambodia, India, Laos, Nepal, Singapore, 
Myanmar (Burma), Vietnam, Sri Lanka 
United States  11  
Online  13 Samples from global online marketplaces  
World  5 Citations of general ‘world’ price in a given year 
 
1Regional groupings as assigned by Martin and Stiles (2000, 2002, 2003, 2005)  544 
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Table 2. The final predictive model of LnPrice showing the significant fixed factors and 545 
covariates and their significant interactions together with the parameter estimates, significance 546 
and a 95% confidence interval of the estimate. 547 
Term Estimate Std. Error Statistic P-value 
Intercept 3.6277 0.3732 9.7196 0.0000 
Year As Transaction Index 0.0059 0.0016 3.5940 0.0004 
Year As Gold 0.0006 0.0003 2.1660 0.0313 
Continent E Asia 4.3084 0.8966 4.8054 0.0000 
Continent Europe 1.5355 0.8399 1.8282 0.0688 
Continent Online -0.1124 0.4890 -0.2299 0.8183 
Continent S Asia 1.7385 0.8421 2.0645 0.0401 
Continent USA 0.2568 0.5163 0.4974 0.6194 
Continent World 1.6990 0.4827 3.5199 0.0005 
Type Polished -0.0478 0.2121 -0.2252 0.8220 
Type Raw -0.8909 0.2346 -3.7971 0.0002 
Legality Legal -0.2185 0.3089 -0.7072 0.4801 
Legality Unknown 0.8313 0.3045 2.7296 0.0068 
Continent E Asia: Type Polished  -0.4767 0.9872 -0.4829 0.6296 
Continent Europe: Type Polished -0.6327 1.1115 -0.5692 0.5698 
Continent Online: Type Polished 1.9607 0.6955 2.8189 0.0052 
Continent S Asia: Type Polished 0.7469 0.8727 0.8559 0.3930 
Continent E Asia: Type Raw -2.1450 0.8503 -2.5227 0.0123 
 28 
 548 
Continent Europe: Type Raw -0.2244 0.8658 -0.2592 0.7957 
Continent Online: Type Raw  2.0591 0.6386 3.2244 0.0014 
Continent S Asia: Type Raw  0.0615 0.8251 0.0745 0.9407 
Continent USA: Type Raw 0.5250 0.5729 0.9163 0.3605 
Continent E Asia: Legality Legal -1.0727 0.4367 -2.4567 0.0148 
Continent Europe: Legality Legal -1.5564 0.6265 -2.4842 0.0137 
Continent S Asia: Legality Legal 0.5047 0.3918 1.2882 0.1990 
Continent World: Legality Legal 0.5353 0.7497 0.7140 0.4759 
Continent E Asia: Legality Unknown -1.0407 0.4227 -2.4624 0.0145 
Continent S Asia: Legality Unknown -0.5872 0.4221 -1.3912 0.1655 
Figure 1. Global ivory market price data 1989-2017 with best-fit line options (linear split at 2007 
and LOESS)
Figure 2. Regional and global trends of ivory price 1990-2017 based on the mean LnPrice for 
each year
a. Ivory Region*Legality Means Plot
b. Ivory Region*Type Means Plot
Figure 3. Means plots showing the interaction effects of region*legality and region*type on 
global ivory market price 1989-2017. In Fig. 3a LnPrice is depicted as it varies according to 
legality across regions, whilst in Fig. 3b the LnPrice is shown as it varies according to type 
across region (whilst all other predictive variables are held constant). The covariate TI in the 
model is evaluated at 146.29, and the covariate Gold Price at 661.55.
Appendix A: Literature Review Samples












to 2017 LnPrice Legality Citation
China E Asia Raw 2010 750 750 218.056 772.25 6.65 Illegal (AFP, 2014)
China E Asia Raw 2014 2100 2100 236.736 1991.68 7.60 Illegal (AFP, 2014)
China E Asia Raw 2013 5700 5700 232.957 5493.69 8.61 Legal (Gao and Clark, 2014)
Online Online Raw 2014 2150 2150 236.736 2039.10 7.62 Illegal (Gao and Clark, 2014)
Tanzania Africa Raw 2014 >5kg 5 275 275 236.736 260.82 5.56 Illegal (Gao and Clark, 2014)
Second stockpile sale Raw 2008 157
157




Second stockpile sale Raw 2008 1500
1500












China E Asia Raw 1989 5-10kg 7 197-350 273.5 124 495.22 6.21 Unknonwn (Stiles, 2004)
China E Asia Raw 2002 5-10kg 7 120-170 145 179.9 180.97 5.20 Unknonwn (Stiles, 2004)
Hong Kong E Asia Raw 1988 5-10kg 7 180 180 118.3 341.63 5.83 Unknonwn (Stiles, 2004)
Hong Kong E Asia Raw 2002 5-10kg 7 200-300 250 179.9 312.01 5.74 Unknonwn (Stiles, 2004)
Japan E Asia Raw 1989 5-10kg 7 288 288 124 521.48 6.26 Unknonwn (Stiles, 2004)
Japan E Asia Raw 2002 5-10kg 7 140-320 230 179.9 287.05 5.66 Unknonwn (Stiles, 2004)
Cote D'Ivoire Africa Raw 1999 5-10kg 7 40-80 60 166.6 80.86 4.39 Unknonwn (Stiles, 2004)
Cameroon Africa Raw 1989 5-10kg 7 65-81 73 124 132.18 4.88 Unknonwn (Stiles, 2004)
Cameroon Africa Raw 1999 5-10kg 7 27-50 38.5 166.6 51.89 3.95 Unknonwn (Stiles, 2004)
DRC Africa Raw 1989 5-10kg 7 40-50 45 124 81.48 4.40 Unknonwn (Stiles, 2004)
DRC Africa Raw 1999 5-10kg 7 30-50 40 166.6 53.91 3.99 Unknonwn (Stiles, 2004)
Gabon Africa Raw 1989 5-10kg 7 45-65 55 124 99.59 4.60 Unknonwn (Stiles, 2004)
Gabon Africa Raw 1999 5-10kg 7 30-42 36 166.6 48.52 3.88 Unknonwn (Stiles, 2004)
Nigeria Africa Raw 1989 5-10kg 7 14-29 21.5 124 38.93 3.66 Unknonwn (Stiles, 2004)
Nigeria Africa Raw 1999 5-10kg 7 46-50 48 166.6 64.69 4.17 Unknonwn (Stiles, 2004)
Myanmar S Asia Raw 2001 5-10kg 7 91-182 136.5 177.1 173.05 5.15 Unknonwn (Stiles, 2004)
Vietnam S Asia Raw 2001 5-10kg 7 142-350 246 177.1 311.88 5.74 Unknonwn (Stiles, 2004)
Singapore S Asia Raw 2001 5-10kg 7 350-500 425 177.1 538.81 6.29 Unknonwn (Stiles, 2004)
Egypt Africa Raw 1999 5-10kg 7 62-98 80 166.6 107.82 4.68 Unknonwn (Stiles, 2004)
Zimbabwe Africa Raw 1999 5-10kg 7 12 17 14.5 166.6 19.54 2.97 Unknonwn (Stiles, 2004)
Cote D'Ivoire Africa Raw 1999 5-10kg 7 58-80 69 166.6 92.99 4.53 Unknonwn (Stiles, 2004)
Ethiopia Africa Raw 1999 5-10kg 7 37-53 45 166.6 60.65 4.11 Unknonwn (Stiles, 2004)
Cameroon Africa Raw 1999 5-10kg 7 30-50 40 166.6 53.91 3.99 Unknonwn (Stiles, 2004)
Nigeria Africa Raw 1999 5-10kg 7 50 50 166.6 67.38 4.21 Unknonwn (Stiles, 2004)
Cote D'Ivoire Africa Raw 1999 5-10kg 7 40-80 60 166.6 80.86 4.39 Unknonwn (Stiles, 2004)
Cote D'Ivoire Africa Raw 2002 5-10kg 7 115-123 119 179.9 148.52 5.00 Unknonwn (Stiles, 2004)
Senegal Africa Raw 1999 5-10kg 7 100-120 110 166.6 148.25 5.00 Unknonwn (Stiles, 2004)
Senegal Africa Raw 2002 5-10kg 7 115-164 139.5 179.9 174.10 5.16 Unknonwn (Stiles, 2004)
Nigeria Africa Raw 1999 5-10kg 7 46-50 48 166.6 64.69 4.17 Unknonwn (Stiles, 2004)
Nigeria Africa Raw 2002 5-10kg 7 24-36 30 179.9 37.44 3.62 Unknonwn (Stiles, 2004)
Kenya Africa Raw 1969 2.5 2.5 2.50 224.53 5.41 Unknonwn
(Messer, 2000)(Lemieux 
and Clarke, 2009)
Kenya Africa Raw 1978 34 34 34.00 224.53 5.41 Unknonwn
(Messer 2000) (Lemieux 
and Clarke, 2009)
Kenya Africa Raw 1989 90 90 124 162.96 5.09 Unknonwn
(Messer 2000) ((Lemieux 
and Clarke, 2009)
World World Raw 2004 200 200 188.9 237.72 5.47 Unknonwn (Stiles et al., 2011)
World World Raw 2007 850 850 207.3 920.63 6.83 Unknonwn (Stiles et al., 2011)
World World Raw 2009 1700 1700 214.537 1779.15 7.48 Unknonwn (Stiles et al., 2011)
Vietnam S Asia Raw 2009 1500 1500 214.537 1569.83 7.36 Unknonwn (Stiles et al., 2011)
Vietnam S Asia Raw 2009 1500 1500 214.537 1569.83 7.36 Unknonwn (Stiles et al., 2011)
Vietnam S Asia Raw 2009 1500 1500 214.537 1569.83 7.36 Unknonwn (Stiles et al., 2011)
China E Asia Raw 2011 1700 1700 224.939 1696.87 7.44 Unknonwn (Stiles et al., 2011)
China E Asia Raw 2014 2100 2100 236.736 1991.68 7.60 Unknonwn (Martin et al., 2017)
China E Asia Raw 2015 1100 1100 237.017 1042.02 6.95 Unknonwn (Martin et al., 2017)
China E Asia Raw 2017 730 730 224.525 730.00 6.59 Unknonwn (Martin et al., 2017)
Kenya Africa Raw 2007 30 30 207.3 32.49 3.48 Illegal (Wittemyer, 2015)
Kenya Africa Raw 2011 150-180 84 224.939 83.85 4.43 Illegal (Wittemyer, 2015)
Kenya Africa Raw 2013 100 100 232.957 96.38 4.57 Illegal (Wittemyer, 2015)
Hong Kong E Asia Raw 1979 68.82 68.82 72.6 212.83 5.36 Unknonwn (Parker and Martin, 1983)
Hong Kong E Asia Raw 1980 62.77 62.77 82.4 171.04 5.14 Unknonwn (Parker and Martin, 1983)
Hong Kong E Asia Raw 1981 46.3 46.3 90.9 114.36 4.74 Unknonwn (Parker and Martin, 1983)
Hong Kong E Asia Raw 1982 38.23 38.23 96.5 88.95 4.49 Unknonwn (Parker and Martin, 1983)
Japan E Asia Raw 1979 84.7 84.7 72.6 261.95 5.57 Unknonwn (Parker and Martin, 1983)
Japan E Asia Raw 1980 75.64 75.64 82.4 206.11 5.33 Unknonwn (Parker and Martin, 1983)
Japan E Asia Raw 1981 79.13 79.13 90.9 195.45 5.28 Unknonwn (Parker and Martin, 1983)
Japan E Asia Raw 1982 74.06 74.06 96.5 172.31 5.15 Unknonwn (Parker and Martin, 1983)
China E Asia Raw 2006 564 564 201.6 628.14 6.44 Unknonwn (Gabriel et al., 2011)
China E Asia Raw 2009 1133 1133 214.537 1185.75 7.08 Unknonwn (Gabriel et al., 2011)
China E Asia Raw 2011 1322 1322 224.939 1319.57 7.19 Unknonwn (Gabriel et al., 2011)
China E Asia Raw 1939
14,941 
YEN Unknonwn (Fischer, 2004)
China E Asia Raw 1989
37,216 
YEN 124 Unknonwn (Fischer, 2004)
China E Asia Raw 1999
10904 
YEN 166.6 Unknonwn (Fischer, 2004)
Nepal S Asia Raw 1998 81 81 163 111.57 4.71 Unknonwn (Martin, 1998)
Nepal S Asia Raw 1998 242 242 163 333.34 5.81 Unknonwn (Martin, 1998)
Vietnam S Asia Raw 2015 1100 1100 237.017 1042.02 6.95 Unknonwn (Vigne and Martin, 2016)
Vietnam S Asia Raw 1990 100 100 130.7 171.79 5.15 Unknonwn (Vigne and Martin, 2016)
Vietnam S Asia Raw 1991 150 150 136.2 247.27 5.51 Unknonwn (Vigne and Martin, 2016)
Vietnam S Asia Raw 1989 2-3kg 2.5 150 150 124 271.60 5.60 Unknonwn (Vigne and Martin, 2016)
Vietnam S Asia Raw 1990 2-3kg 2.5 200 200 130.7 343.57 5.84 Unknonwn (Vigne and Martin, 2016)
Vietnam S Asia Raw 2003 350 350 184 427.09 6.06 Unknonwn (Vigne and Martin, 2016)
Vietnam S Asia Raw 2008
500-
1500 1000 215.303 1042.83 6.95 Unknonwn (Vigne and Martin, 2016)
Vietnam S Asia Raw 2015
845-
1032 938.5 237.017 889.04 6.79 Unknonwn (Vigne and Martin, 2016)
Vietnam S Asia Raw 2015
889-
1244 1066.5 237.017 1010.29 6.92 Unknonwn (Vigne and Martin, 2016)
Vietnam S Asia Raw 2010 1743 1743 218.056 1794.71 7.49 Unknonwn (Vigne and Martin, 2016)
Vietnam S Asia Raw 2014 1262 1262 236.736 1196.91 7.09 Unknonwn (Vigne and Martin, 2016)
Vietnam S Asia Raw 2015 3-4kg 3.5 1067 1067 237.017 1010.76 6.92 Unknonwn (Vigne and Martin, 2016)
Vietnam S Asia Raw 2015
1289-
1333 1311 237.017 1241.90 7.12 Unknonwn (Vigne and Martin, 2016)
Vietnam S Asia Raw 2015 1111 1111 237.017 1052.44 6.96 Unknonwn (Vigne and Martin, 2016)
Vietnam S Asia Raw 2015 4 1333 1333 237.017 1262.74 7.14 Unknonwn (Vigne and Martin, 2016)
Vietnam S Asia Raw 2011 Tips 1998 1998 224.939 1994.32 7.60 Unknonwn (Vigne and Martin, 2016)
Vietnam S Asia Raw 2015 889 889 237.017 842.15 6.74 Unknonwn (Vigne and Martin, 2016)
Vietnam S Asia Raw 2014 1122 1122 236.736 1064.13 6.97 Unknonwn (Vigne and Martin, 2016)
Vietnam S Asia Raw 2015 800-889 844.5 237.017 799.99 6.68 Unknonwn (Vigne and Martin, 2016)
Vietnam S Asia Raw 2015 1156 1156 237.017 1095.07 7.00 Unknonwn (Vigne and Martin, 2016)
Vietnam S Asia Raw 2015
1333-
1556 1444.5 237.017 1368.37 7.22 Unknonwn (Vigne and Martin, 2016)
Vietnam S Asia Raw 2013
1421-
1669 1545 232.957 1489.08 7.31 Unknonwn (Vigne and Martin, 2016)
Vietnam S Asia Raw 2015 1156 1156 237.017 1095.07 7.00 Unknonwn (Vigne and Martin, 2016)
Vietnam S Asia Raw 2012
1440-
1681 1560.5 229.594 1526.05 7.33 Unknonwn (Vigne and Martin, 2016)
Vietnam S Asia Raw 2015 1156 1156 237.017 1095.07 7.00 Unknonwn (Vigne and Martin, 2016)
Vietnam S Asia Raw 2013 1421 1421 232.957 1369.57 7.22 Unknonwn (Vigne and Martin, 2016)
Vietnam S Asia Raw 2015 1111 1111 237.017 1052.44 6.96 Unknonwn (Vigne and Martin, 2016)
Vietnam S Asia Raw 2015
Low 
quality 311-356 333.5 237.017 315.92 5.76 Unknonwn (Vigne and Martin, 2016)
Vietnam S Asia Raw 2015
High 
quality 1333 1333 237.017 1262.74 7.14 Unknonwn (Vigne and Martin, 2016)
Vietnam S Asia Raw 2015 889 889 237.017 842.15 6.74 Unknonwn (Vigne and Martin, 2016)
China E Asia Raw 2013 590 590 232.957 568.64 6.34 Unknonwn (Montazeri, 2013)
USA USA Raw 1979 3-4kg 3.5 63 63 72.6 194.84 5.27 Unknonwn (Stiles and Martin, 2008)
USA USA Raw 1989 3-4kg 3.5 100 100 124 181.07 5.20 Unknonwn (Stiles and Martin, 2008)
USA USA Raw 1990 3-4kg 3.5 132 132 130.7 226.76 5.42 Unknonwn (Stiles and Martin, 2008)
USA USA Raw 2000 3-4kg 3.5 176 176 172.2 229.48 5.44 Unknonwn (Stiles and Martin, 2008)
USA USA Raw 2002 3-4kg 3.5 165 165 179.9 205.93 5.33 Unknonwn (Stiles and Martin, 2008)
USA USA Raw 2004 3-4kg 3.5 200 200 188.9 237.72 5.47 Unknonwn (Stiles and Martin, 2008)
USA USA Raw 2005 3-4kg 3.5 220 220 195.3 252.92 5.53 Unknonwn (Stiles and Martin, 2008)
USA USA Raw 2006 3-4kg 3.5 187 187 201.6 208.26 5.34 Unknonwn (Stiles and Martin, 2008)
USA USA Raw 2007 3-4kg 3.5 204 204 207.3 220.95 5.40 Unknonwn (Stiles and Martin, 2008)
USA USA Carved 2014 595-645 62 236.736 58.80 4.07 Unknonwn (Stiles, 2015)
USA USA Carved 2014
4150-
10560 7355 236.736 6975.62 8.85 Unknonwn (Stiles, 2015)
USA USA Carved 2014 500 500 236.736 474.21 6.16 Unknonwn (Stiles, 2015)
USA USA Carved 2014
6000-
8000 7000 236.736 6638.94 8.80 Unknonwn (Stiles, 2015)







207.3 374.75 5.93 Unknonwn
(Stiles, 2015)







207.3 200.37 5.30 Unknonwn
(Stiles, 2015)







207.3 285.94 5.66 Unknonwn
(Stiles, 2015)
USA (online) Online Carved 2007
>20kgSemi-worked 
raw 287-293 290 207.3 314.10 5.75 Unknonwn (Stiles, 2015)
Egypt Africa Raw 2000 5-11kg 8 78.49 78.49 172.2 102.34 4.63 Unknonwn (Martin, 2000)
Egypt Africa Raw 2000 >12kg 12 117.23 117.23 172.2 152.85 5.03 Unknonwn (Martin, 2000)
Egypt Africa Raw 2000 1-4kg 2.5 93.96 93.96 172.2 122.51 4.81 Unknonwn (Martin, 2000)
Egypt Africa Raw 2000 5-10kg 7 102.58 102.58 172.2 133.75 4.90 Unknonwn (Martin, 2000)
Egypt Africa Raw 2000 >20kg 20 237.47 237.47 172.2 309.63 5.74 Unknonwn (Martin, 2000)
Sri Lanka S Asia Raw 1989 228-285 256.5 124 464.44 6.14 Unknonwn (Santiapillai et al., 1999)
Sri Lanka S Asia Raw 1990 72 72 130.7 123.69 4.82 Unknonwn (Santiapillai et al., 1999)






237.017 922.67 6.83 Illegal
(Stiles, 2015)
China (online) Online Raw 2014 <5kg 5 2100 2100 236.736 1991.68 7.60 Illegal (Stiles, 2015)
China (online) Online Raw 2015 921 921 237.017 872.46 6.77 Illegal (Stiles, 2015)
China (online) Online Raw 2015 460-575 517.5 237.017 490.23 6.19 Illegal (Stiles, 2015)
China (online) Online Raw 2015 14.2 974 974 237.017 922.67 6.83 Illegal (Stiles, 2015)
China (online) Online Polished 2014 2930 2930 236.736 2778.87 7.93 Illegal (Stiles, 2015)
China (online) Online Polished 2015 <10kg 5 2650 2650 237.017 2510.33 7.83 Illegal (Stiles, 2015)
China (online) Online Polished 2015 >10kg 15
1628-
1943 1785.5 237.017 1691.40 7.43 Illegal (Stiles, 2015)
Appendix B: Transaction Index vs. Year
Appendix C: Histogram of ivory sample weights
Appendix D: Total ivory destroyed (kg) from 1989-2016
